Program
MINICOURSES:
M1 – Cooperative Games – Pradeep DUBEY (Stony Brook University)
M2 – Market Design – Michael OSTROVSKY (Stanford University)
M3 – Algorithms for Structured Stochastic Games – T. E. S. RAGHAVAN (University of Illinois–Chicago)
M4 – Fair Division – Hervé MOULIN (University of Glasgow)
M5 – Equilibrium Computation for Non-Cooperative Games – Bernhard VON STENGEL (London School of Economics)
M6 – Information Theory – David PÉREZ‑CASTRILLO (Barcelona School of Economics)
INVITED SESSIONS:
MARKET DESIGN, NETWORKS:
Michael OSTROVSKY (Stanford University) – “Pure-Strategy Equilibrium in the Generalized First-Price Auction”
Marcos ROSS (University of São Paulo) – “Combining Combined Forecasts: a Network Approach”
INFORMATION ECONOMICS:
Humberto MOREIRA (EPGE, Fundação Getulio Vargas – Rio de Janeiro) – “Bayesian Auction Design with ML Predictions”
A. GOMES (WU-ST. LOUIS) – “The Economics of Savings-and-Credit Contracts”
MATCHING:
Marina NUÑEZ (University of Barcelona) – “Reconciling marginalism and stability in two-sided assignment games”
Jorge OVIEDO (Universidad Nacional de San Luis) – “Stability and Pseudo-Stability in Many-to-Many Markets with Responsive Preferences”
Alejandro NEME (Universidad Nacional de San Luis) – “Weak Obvious Manipulations”
PRINCIPAL–AGENT, GEOMETRY OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM, ARBITRATION:
Álvaro SANDRONI (Northwestern University) – “Constructing God”
Bernhard VON STENGEL (London School of Economics) – “New maximum numbers of Nash equilibria”
Brian POWERS (University of Wisconsin–Madison) – “N-Player Final-Offer Arbitration and it’s Harmonic Equilibrium”
SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS, AGGREGATIVE GAMES, MATCHING:
M. BUGARIN (UnB) – “Advantage for sale: Endogeneous asymmetry in sequential auctions”
W. MALDONADO (USP) – “Aggregative games: E-stability and applications”
A. URBANO (UV) – “Multiproduct Trading of Indivisible Goods with Many Sellers and Buyers”
FAIR DIVISION, INFORMATION ECONOMICS, SHAPLEY VALUE:
A. BOGOMOLNAIA (UG) – “Fair Division under objective constraints”
O. GOSSNER (LSE) – “Strong Information Design”
I. MACHO-STADLER (BSE) – “Cooperative solution for intertemporal games with externalities”
SPEAKERS FOR THE PLENARY SESSIONS:
Robert AUMANN (Nobel Prize in Economics of 2005 – Hebrew University of Jerusalem) – “Why Consciousness?”
Gabrielle DEMANGE (Paris School of Economics; École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales) – “Two-mode activities in a social network”
Sergiu HART (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) – “From Calibration to ‘Calibeating’: Beating Forecasters at Their Own Game”
Ehud KALAI (Northwestern University) – “Contagious Implementation in Prisoners and Other Dilemmas”
Eric MASKIN (Nobel Prize in Economics of 2007 – Harvard University) – “Strategic Voting and Majority Rule”
Paul MILGROM (Nobel Prize in Economics of 2020 – Stanford University) – “Market Design and Online Advertising”
Hervé MOULIN (University of Glasgow) – “Fair Division: the last twenty years”
Roger MYERSON (Nobel Prize in Economics of 2007 – University of Chicago) – “Dual reduction and elementary Bayesian games”
Alvin ROTH (Nobel Prize in Economics of 2012 – Stanford University) – “Controversial Markets and Black Markets”
Marilda SOTOMAYOR (University of São Paulo; EPGE, FGV) – “COMPETITION AND COOPERATION IN A TWO-SIDED MATCHING MARKET WITH REPLICATION”
Robert WILSON (Nobel Prize in Economics of 2020 – Stanford University) – “Reciprocity with Finite Recall”
ROUND TABLE:
COORDINATOR:
Yair TAUMAN (Stony Brook University) – “Licensing of cost reducing or quality improving innovations, a unified approach”
PARTICIPANTS:
Abraham NEYMAN (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) – “Is the sunk cost principle universally valid?”
Robert AUMANN (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) – “Why Consciousness?”
Roger MYERSON (Northwestern University) – “Dual reduction and elementary Bayesian games”
SPEAKERS FOR THE SEMI-PLENARY SESSIONS:
Rabah AMIR (University of Iowa) – “On the comparative statics of Nash equilibria”
Aloísio ARAÚJO (National Institute for Pure and Applied Mathematics, EPGE, FGV – RJ) – “Growth and Redistribution with Heterogeneous Attitudes toward Risk”
Salvador BARBERÀ (Barcelona School of Economics) – “On the endogenous order of play in sequential games”
Tilman BÖRGERS (University of Michigan) – “Undominated Mechanisms”
Pradeep DUBEY (Stony Brook University) – “Simultaneous Elections in a Polarized Society make Single Party Sweeps more likely”
Faruk GUL (Princeton University) – “Lorenz Expected Utility and First-Order Risk Aversion”
Vijay KRISHNA (Pennsylvania State University) – “Informational Content of Auction Prices”
Abraham NEYMAN (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) – “Is the sunk cost principle universally valid?”
David PÉREZ‑CASTRILLO (Barcelona School of Economics) – “The tradewise-core for transferable utility games”
Dov SAMET (Tel Aviv University) – “Interpersonal Independence of knowledge and belief”
Joel SOBEL (University of California, San Diego) – “TBA”
Yair TAUMAN (Stony Brook University) – “Licensing of cost reducing or quality improving innovations, a unified approach”
Myrna WOODERS (Vanderbilt University) – “Pricing people and objects via core assignments”
Shmuel ZAMIR (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) – “On information in auctions”