{"id":126,"date":"2025-08-14T08:50:25","date_gmt":"2025-08-14T11:50:25","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.iwgts.fea.usp.br\/about\/"},"modified":"2026-04-03T16:38:52","modified_gmt":"2026-04-03T19:38:52","slug":"event-program","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/www.iwgtea.fea.usp.br\/site1\/event-program\/","title":{"rendered":"Program"},"content":{"rendered":"\t\t
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Program<\/h1>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t
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MINICOURSES:<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
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M1 – Cooperative Games<\/strong> \u2013 Pradeep DUBEY<\/strong> (Stony Brook University)<\/p>

M2 – Market Design<\/strong> \u2013 Michael OSTROVSKY<\/strong> (Stanford University)<\/p>

M3 – Algorithms for Structured Stochastic Games<\/b>\u00a0\u2013 T. E. S. RAGHAVAN<\/strong> (University of Illinois\u2013Chicago)<\/p>

M4 – Fair Division<\/strong> \u2013 Herv\u00e9 MOULIN<\/strong> (University of Glasgow)<\/p>

M5 – Equilibrium Computation for Non-Cooperative Games<\/strong> \u2013 Bernhard VON\u202fSTENGEL<\/strong> (London School of Economics)<\/p>

M6 – Economics of Information: Contracts, Matching, and Behavioral Biases<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 David P\u00c9REZ\u2011CASTRILLO <\/strong>(Barcelona School of Economics)<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t

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(See minicourses content)<\/a><\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
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INVITED SESSIONS:<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
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MARKET DESIGN, NETWORKS:<\/strong><\/p>

Michael OSTROVSKY<\/strong> (Stanford University) \u2013 “Pure-Strategy Equilibrium in the Generalized First-Price Auction”
Marcos ROSS<\/strong> (University of S\u00e3o Paulo) \u2013 “Combining Combined Forecasts: a Network Approach”<\/p>

INFORMATION ECONOMICS:<\/strong><\/p>

Humberto MOREIRA<\/strong> (EPGE, Funda\u00e7\u00e3o Getulio Vargas \u2013 Rio de Janeiro) \u2013 “Bayesian Auction Design with ML Predictions”
A. GOMES<\/strong> (WU-ST. LOUIS) \u2013 “The Economics of Savings-and-Credit Contracts”<\/p>

MATCHING:<\/strong><\/p>

Marina NU\u00d1EZ<\/strong> (University of Barcelona) \u2013 “Reconciling marginalism and stability in two-sided assignment games”
Jorge OVIEDO<\/strong> (Universidad Nacional de San Luis) \u2013 “Stability and Pseudo-Stability in Many-to-Many Markets with Responsive Preferences”<\/p>

A. URBANO<\/strong> (UV) \u2013 “Multiproduct Trading of Indivisible Goods with Many Sellers and Buyers”<\/p>

PRINCIPAL\u2013AGENT, GEOMETRY OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM, ARBITRATION:<\/strong><\/p>

\u00c1lvaro SANDRONI<\/strong> (Northwestern University) \u2013 “Digital Minds”
Bernhard VON STENGEL<\/strong> (London School of Economics) \u2013 “New maximum numbers of Nash equilibria”
Brian POWERS<\/strong> (University of Wisconsin\u2013Madison) \u2013 “N-Player Final-Offer Arbitration and it’s Harmonic Equilibrium”<\/p>

SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS, AGGREGATIVE GAMES:<\/strong><\/p>

M. BUGARIN<\/strong> (UnB) \u2013 “Advantage for sale: Endogeneous asymmetry in sequential auctions”
W. MALDONADO<\/strong> (USP) \u2013 “Aggregative games: E-stability and applications”<\/p>

FAIR DIVISION, INFORMATION ECONOMICS, SHAPLEY VALUE:<\/strong><\/p>

A. BOGOMOLNAIA<\/strong> (UG) \u2013 “Fair Division under objective constraints”
O. GOSSNER<\/strong> (LSE) \u2013 “Strong Information Design”
I. MACHO-STADLER<\/strong> (BSE) \u2013 “Cooperative solution for intertemporal games with externalities”<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t

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SPEAKERS FOR THE PLENARY SESSIONS:<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
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Robert AUMANN<\/strong> (Nobel Prize in Economics of 2005 – Hebrew University of Jerusalem) \u2013 “Why Consciousness?”<\/p>\n\n

Gabrielle DEMANGE<\/strong> (Paris School of Economics; \u00c9cole des Hautes \u00c9tudes en Sciences Sociales) \u2013 “Two-mode activities in a social network”<\/p>\n\n

Sergiu HART<\/strong> (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) \u2013 “From Calibration to ‘Calibeating’: Beating Forecasters at Their Own Game”<\/p>\n\n

Ehud KALAI<\/strong> (Northwestern University) \u2013 “Contagious Implementation in Prisoners and Other Dilemmas”<\/p>\n\n

Eric MASKIN<\/strong> (Nobel Prize in Economics of 2007 – Harvard University) \u2013 “Strategic Voting and Majority Rule”<\/p>\n\n

Paul MILGROM<\/strong> (Nobel Prize in Economics of 2020 – Stanford University) \u2013 “Market Design and Online Advertising”<\/p>\n\n

Herv\u00e9 MOULIN<\/strong> (University of Glasgow) \u2013 “Fair Division: the last twenty years”<\/p>\n\n

Roger MYERSON<\/strong> (Nobel Prize in Economics of 2007 – University of Chicago) \u2013 “Dual reduction and elementary Bayesian games”<\/p>\n\n

Alvin ROTH<\/strong> (Nobel Prize in Economics of 2012 – Stanford University) \u2013 “Controversial Markets and Black Markets”<\/p>\n\n

Marilda SOTOMAYOR<\/strong> (University of S\u00e3o Paulo; EPGE, FGV) \u2013 “COMPETITION AND COOPERATION IN A TWO-SIDED MATCHING MARKET WITH REPLICATION”<\/p>\n\n

Robert WILSON<\/strong> (Nobel Prize in Economics of 2020 – Stanford University) \u2013 “Reciprocity with Finite Recall”<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t

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ROUND TABLE:<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
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COORDINATOR:<\/strong><\/p>\n

Yair TAUMAN<\/strong> (Stony Brook University) \u2013 “Licensing of cost reducing or quality improving innovations, a unified approach”<\/p>\n\n

PARTICIPANTS:<\/strong><\/p>\n

Abraham NEYMAN<\/strong> (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) \u2013 “Is the sunk cost principle universally valid?”
\nRobert AUMANN<\/strong> (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) \u2013 “Why Consciousness?”
\nRoger MYERSON<\/strong> (Northwestern University) \u2013 “Dual reduction and elementary Bayesian games”<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t

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SPEAKERS FOR THE SEMI-PLENARY SESSIONS:<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t
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Rabah AMIR<\/strong> (University of Iowa) \u2013 “On the comparative statics of Nash equilibria”<\/p>

Alo\u00edsio ARA\u00daJO<\/strong> (National Institute for Pure and Applied Mathematics, EPGE, FGV \u2013 RJ) \u2013 “Growth and Redistribution with Heterogeneous Attitudes toward Risk”<\/p>

Salvador BARBER\u00c0<\/strong> (Barcelona School of Economics) \u2013 “On the endogenous order of play in sequential games”<\/p>

Tilman B\u00d6RGERS<\/strong> (University of Michigan) \u2013 “Undominated Mechanisms”<\/p>

Pradeep DUBEY<\/strong> (Stony Brook University) \u2013 “Simultaneous Elections in a Polarized Society make Single Party Sweeps more likely”<\/p>

Faruk GUL<\/strong> (Princeton University) \u2013 “Lorenz Expected Utility and First-Order Risk Aversion”<\/p>

Vijay KRISHNA<\/strong> (Pennsylvania State University) \u2013 “Informational Content of Auction Prices”<\/p>

Abraham NEYMAN<\/strong> (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) \u2013 “Is the sunk cost principle universally valid?”<\/p>

David P\u00c9REZ\u2011CASTRILLO<\/strong> (Barcelona School of Economics) \u2013 “The tradewise-core for transferable utility games”<\/p>

Dov SAMET<\/strong> (Tel Aviv University) \u2013 “Interpersonal Independence of knowledge and belief”<\/p>

Joel SOBEL<\/strong> (University of California, San Diego) \u2013 “Good Sports”<\/p>

Yair TAUMAN<\/strong> (Stony Brook University) \u2013 “Licensing of cost reducing or quality improving innovations, a unified approach”<\/p>

Myrna WOODERS<\/strong> (Vanderbilt University) \u2013 “Pricing people and objects via core assignments”<\/p>

Shmuel ZAMIR<\/b> (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) \u2013 “On information in auctions”<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t

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About The IWGTS 2014...<\/h5>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
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A Glimpse of Our History<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t
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Scholars from Around the World<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t
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Interdisciplinary Lecturers<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t
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Engaged Attendees<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
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Program MINICOURSES: M1 – Cooperative Games \u2013 Pradeep DUBEY (Stony Brook University) M2 – Market Design \u2013 Michael OSTROVSKY (Stanford University) M3 – Algorithms for Structured Stochastic Games\u00a0\u2013 T. E. S. RAGHAVAN (University of Illinois\u2013Chicago) M4 – Fair Division \u2013 Herv\u00e9 MOULIN (University of Glasgow) M5 – Equilibrium Computation for Non-Cooperative Games \u2013 Bernhard VON\u202fSTENGEL […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"site-sidebar-layout":"no-sidebar","site-content-layout":"page-builder","ast-site-content-layout":"full-width-container","site-content-style":"unboxed","site-sidebar-style":"unboxed","ast-global-header-display":"","ast-banner-title-visibility":"","ast-main-header-display":"","ast-hfb-above-header-display":"","ast-hfb-below-header-display":"","ast-hfb-mobile-header-display":"","site-post-title":"disabled","ast-breadcrumbs-content":"","ast-featured-img":"disabled","footer-sml-layout":"","theme-transparent-header-meta":"enabled","adv-header-id-meta":"","stick-header-meta":"","header-above-stick-meta":"","header-main-stick-meta":"","header-below-stick-meta":"","astra-migrate-meta-layouts":"set","ast-page-background-enabled":"default","ast-page-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"ast-content-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-126","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.iwgtea.fea.usp.br\/site1\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/126","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.iwgtea.fea.usp.br\/site1\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.iwgtea.fea.usp.br\/site1\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.iwgtea.fea.usp.br\/site1\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.iwgtea.fea.usp.br\/site1\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=126"}],"version-history":[{"count":76,"href":"https:\/\/www.iwgtea.fea.usp.br\/site1\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/126\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1881,"href":"https:\/\/www.iwgtea.fea.usp.br\/site1\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/126\/revisions\/1881"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.iwgtea.fea.usp.br\/site1\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=126"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}